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Since European socialist parties decided to participate in elections, around the turn
of the century, many scholars have viewed European politics as the expression of 'the
democratic class struggle.'   That phrase was apparently first used in the title of a book by
Dewey Anderson and Percy Davidson (1943), Ballots and the Democratic Class Struggle,
with reference to the American experience,  and the idea continues to resonate.  Seymour
Martin Lipset's (1959)  classic Political Man  is organized around the theme, with a chapter
entitled "Elections: The expression of democratic class struggle," and the title of Adam
Przeworski and John Sprague's (1986) Paper Stones  is a phrase that early German
socialists used to describe ballots: like real stones, casting them against the bourgeoisie
could topple them from power
1.    The class analysis of elections is the hallmark of almost
countless other studies:  the best include Tingsten (1941),  Abraham (1981), and Hamilton
(1982).   
These studies are written in the main by historians and political scientists; as is to be
expected, the latter tend to abstract, somewhat more than the former, from thick historical
particularity in favor of general explanation.  Among the best of these is Gregory Luebbert's
(1991) Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy : Social Classes and the Political
Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe,  in which the author attempts to explain what
                                                
1 Other indicative titles are Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle,  and Paul Nieuwbeerta, The
Democratic Class Struggle in Twenty Countries .2
determined the choice of regime in countries in interwar Europe, among the three types his
title lists.  Luebbert proposes that liberals failed to win, in this period, because they were not
willing to use state power to intervene against what citizenries saw as the heartless effects of
the unrestricted market, while both the socialists and the fascists were willing to do so.
What, then, determined social democratic victories in some states and fascist victories in
others?  Luebbert proposes that the decisive factor was the status of class struggle in the
countryside.
Think of the electorate as composed of four classes: the urban working class, the
urban middle class, the rural peasantry (family farmers who own land), and the rural
proletariat (landless laborers).   The classes of large capitalists and large landowners may, of
course, have been important in their influence on parties
2, but they were trivial as far as
direct voting was concerned.   The key to electoral victory, Luebbert claims, was the
formation of an electoral alliance between the landed peasantry and one of the urban classes.
If  class struggle in the countryside was quiescent, then, he says, the social democrats were
able to appeal to the landed peasantry and to construct an alliance between them and the
urban workers, usually sufficient for electoral victory over the right.  In the cases where
rural class struggle was active, however,   the socialists always took the side of the rural
proletariat,  alienating the landed peasantry (their employers), thus leaving the latter class
open to appeals from the fascists, who were then able to construct an alliance between them
and the urban middle class.   The three countries in which this second scenario transpired
(says Luebbert) were Germany, Italy, and Spain.
It is worth reproducing Luebbert 's prose on this point, as it is central to the present
study.
As we see, however, their [the German Social Democrats'] inability to make an
effective alliance with the countryside had much more to do with their involvement in
agrarian class conflict than it did with the burdens of membership in the initial
Weimar coalition per se.  The polarization of peasant-worker relations that ensued
militated against an alliance that would have embraced measures to address the
peasants' grievances as producers (Luebbert, p. 285).
                                                
2 As Abraham (1981) strongly argues.3
When socialist parties did succeed in making regime-stabilizing coalitions with the
peasantry, it was not because they had a superior grasp of the strategic requirements
of the moment, but because they did not attempt to organize the rural proletariat
(Luebbert, p. 287).
Hence, the Spanish Socialists' campaign for land reform in the south of Spain
antagonized peasants even in the north (Luebbert, p. 286).
Socialists succeeded in making a coalition with family peasants wherever the
agrarian proletariat had been mobilized by others before socialists had an
opportunity to do so (Luebbert, p. 288).
It was this entanglement [in rural class conflict] rather than conflicts between urban
consumers and rural producers that distinguished socialist movements in Germany,
Italy, and Spain from socialist movements in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and
Czechoslovakia (Luebbert, p. 300).
Whatever the quibbles about precisely who voted for the Nazis in Germany, it is
clear that the social core of that support came from the urban middle classes and the
Protestant peasantry of the west (p. 301).
Given the impuissance of liberal movements...the precondition of fascism was a
working-class movement engaged in a defense of the rural proletariat.  The
coalitions of urban and rural middle classes that took shape in Spain, Italy, and
Germany were premised on a common ambition to extirpate the socialist working-
class menace. (p. 303).
My aim is to construct a model of party competition which can test Luebbert's
theory.  The model will consist of two parties, to be thought of as Socialists and Fascists, or
Left and Right, each of which proposes a policy to voters.  A policy  will be a distribution of
the national income among the four classes named above. If national income is fixed, as I
shall assume, then the policy space is three-dimensional, since there are four classes.
Giving each party the freedom to choose any income distribution (among the four classes)
models the idea that both Left and Right parties were willing to intervene in the market:
while the allocations of income that the market can deliver  arguably constitute a small
subspace of the relevant three-dimensional simplex,  these parties, according to Luebbert,
did not restrict themselves to that subspace.   I will examine equilibria of the model under
two 'treatments': first, that class conflict between the two rural classes is not an issue -- has
been resolved-- and second, that it has not been resolved.  The hypothesis I test is that the
probability of a Left victory is greater in the first case than in the second case.4
To carry out this plan, I require a model of competition between parties that possess
preferences over policies  (the Left favors the working classes, and the Right favors the
propertied classes) on a multi-dimensional issue space, with a coherent notion of
equilibrium.  Recently, I have proposed such a model (Roemer [1998]).  The innovation
which delivers political equilibrium on a multi-dimensional domain of policies is the
conceptualization of parties as consisting of factions -- in particular, of opportunists  and
militants.    A political equilibrium consists of policies, one proposed by each party, which
is Nash in the following sense: in neither party can the (internal) factions agree on a
deviation from the proposed policy, given the other party's policy proposal.
This is called a party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE).
Another (realistic) feature of the model is that there is a stochastic element in how
citizens vote, and so the parties can only compute a probability that, given the two policies,
one of them will win.   As I said, I shall test whether the probability of Left victory, in the
PUNE under the first treatment, is greater than the probability of Left victory in the PUNE
under the second treatment.
This model, like any other, makes breath-taking simplifications of reality.  In the
conclusion, I will list a number of caveats due to them.  An advocate of historical
particularism will say that such a spare model can never provide an explanation for political
history that arguably, in each country, depended on the infinite detail of personalities and
events exogenous to the model (e.g., the consequences of the defeat in First World War,
and an ignominious armistice,  for German political behavior).  In large part, Luebbert and
the other authors I have referenced have already fought that methodological battle.   While
our method of explanation via abstraction cannot predict outcomes at any single point in the
domain of time-space history,  it can have power if its predictions are often true, at many
points in that domain.
2. The concept of political equilibrium5
The environment consists of two parties competing for votes of an electorate, where
the parties have preferences over policies (they are partisan), and there is uncertainty
concerning how voters will choose between a pair of policies proposed by the two parties.
Denote the space of policies by T, its generic element by t, and the utility functions, defined
on the domain T, representing (von Neumann-Morgenstern) preferences of the two parties,
as v1 and v2. Given policies t1 and t2 proposed by the parties, there is a probability p(t1,t2)
that t1 defeats t2 in the election.  (The function p is a datum of the problem; it is defined on
T x T.)  Thus, the expected utility of party i, for i=1,2, at the policy pair (t1,t2) is
Pi (t1,t2) = p(t1,t2)vi(t1) + (1- p(t1,t2))vi(t2).
The standard concept of equilibrium for this environment (see Wittman (1981), Roemer
(1997)) is:
Defintion
3  A policy pair (t1,t2) is a reformist Nash equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies of the game where party i has strategy space T and payoff function Pi.
Reformist Nash equilibria typically exist in applications where T is a one-
dimensional space; they generically fail to exist when T is multi-dimensional.  Non-
existence in the latter case is an analogue of, but not the same thing as, the non-existence of
Condorcet winners with multi-dimensional policy spaces.  The Condorcet winner is the
natural concept of political equilibrium in two-party games where the parties are Downsian,
meaning they have no preferences over policies, and desire only to maximize the probability,
p,  of victory.
Here, I briefly review the equilibrium concept introduced in Roemer( 1999 ).  From
reading political history, one observes that parties have factions -- in particular, they
typically contain opportunist , militant  and reformist factions.  Opportunists are those who
wish to maximize the probability of victory, and militants as those who want to maximize
vi(t)  -- not Pi (t1,t2).  Reformists maximize Pi (t1,t2).  The opportunists are the sole faction6
in Anthony Downs's (1957) conception of politics.  Militants are those who are not
primarily concerned with winning elections, but with advertising the preferences (or line) of
the party.  Reformists act like true agents of constituencies.  Party histories are replete with
descriptions of these three factions; for instance, Schorske (1955), in his classical history of
German Social Democracy, discusses the factions of party bureaucrats, trade union
leadership, and radicals.  These correspond, respectively, to our opportunists, reformists, and
militants.
 Note that each of the three factions described has complete preferences over T x T.
Given a policy pair (t1,t2) proposed by the two parties,  say that party 1 agrees to deviate to
t1' at (t1, t2) if all three factions of the party weakly prefer (t1',t2) to (t1,t2), and at least one
faction strictly prefers the former.
Defintion.  A policy pair (t1,t2) is a party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) if it is case
that there is no policy to which either party agrees to deviate at (t1,t2).
The motivation for calling such a policy pair a Nash equilibrium is this.  Define the
preferences of party i on T x T as the intersection
4 of the preferences of its three factions.
Thus the party's preferences are typically incomplete.  A PUNE is just a Nash equilibrium
between the two parties with respect to the parties' preferences, so defined.
It is easy to see that the reformist factions can be dropped, with no change in the
equilibria thus generated: that is, a party's three factions will agree to deviate at a point if and
only if the militant and opportunist factions will agree to deviate at that point.  We shall use
this fact below.
One can also immediately see that reformist Nash equilibrium is a refinement of
PUNE( or, equivalently,  PUNE is an extension of reformist Nash equilibrium).  Therefore,
although reformist Nash equilibria typically fail to exist in multi-dimensional policy games,
                                                                                                                                                
3  This concept was introduced by Wittman (1981), but it was christened with this name in Roemer (1999).7
we can hope that PUNE do exist.  In fact, in the applications I have examined, there is
typically a continuum of PUNEs.
Informally speaking, the concept of PUNE captures the fact of political struggle,
within parties, between groups that are on the one hand primarily concerned with winning
elections, and on the other, primarily concerned with ideological purity.   One might argue
that the PUNE conception is too stark: it rules out compromise between factions, in the
sense that a party will only deviate from a proposed policy if all factions stand to (weakly)
gain.  But let it be noted that, whatever conception of factional compromise one might in
addition elaborate, the equilibria so generated will in fact also be PUNEs: for it surely must
be the case that, at an equilibrium with factional compromise, there exists no policy to which
all factions in one party would agree to deviate.  Thus, any theory of factional compromise
will generate an equilibrium concept which is a refinement of PUNE.  Retaining the PUNE
concept is, therefore, equivalent to remaining agnostic about the precise nature of factional
compromise.
In the rest of the paper, I use PUNE as the concept of political equilibrium between
parties.
3. The Luebbert model
According to Luebbert, interwar European politics were class politics:  each party
appealed to distinct classes by proposing policies which possessed clear consequences
for the class distribution of income.  Whether the Left or Right won was, he wrote,
critically determined by whether class struggle in the countryside was settled or
contested.
                                                                                                                                                
4 Formally, the intersection of the binary relations in (TxT)
2  which define the factional preferences.8
A. The four class model
The four relevant classes are the workers (W), the middle class (M), the landed
peasantry (L), and the agricultural proletariat (A) or landless laborers.  I shall telescope
political behavior by assuming that each party proposes a division of national income
among the four classes, that is, a vector (w,m,l,a), where ww + mm + ll + aa = 1, all
components of which are non-negative, and (w,m,l,a), are the population proportions of
the four classes.  w is the income a worker will receive at this policy, and so on.  The
three-dimensional policy simplex is denoted by S3.
This formulation of the policy space is, clearly, a vast simplification.  In point of
fact, parties proposed complex policies – involving nationalization, taxation, tariff policy,
and land reform, to name several.   I am assuming that voters interpret each set of actual
policies as implying some distribution of income, (w,m,l,a).  That process of
interpretation is here eclipsed.  Furthermore, I am assuming that national income is fixed,
and does not respond to different policies, and that no other constraints (except being in
S3) limit policies.
There are two parties, here called Left (L) and Right (R).  The Left party
'represents' primarily the workers, and secondarily the agricultural proletariat; the Right
'represents' mainly the middle class and secondarily the landed peasantry.  The (von
Neumann-Morgenstern) utility functions of the reformists and militants of the parties are
given by9
vL(w,m,l,a) = Log w + bL Log a (3.1a)
vR(w,m,l,a) = Log m + bR Log l , (3.1b)
where bL and bR are in the interval [0,1].  Thus, each party cares primarily about 'its'
urban class, and gives less weight to the welfare of 'its' rural class.
Indeed, if we dispense with the reformist factions, as I mentioned we can, in §2,
then we need only view vL and vR as representing the ordinal preferences on S3 of the
two militant factions.  (Militants do not evaluate lotteries.)  Thus, equations (3.1) say
that the militant faction in each party has Cobb-Douglas preferences over the distribution
of income within a pair of classes – the Left's militants caring about the urban and rural
workers, and the Right's caring about the urban and rural propertied classes.
We next propose a formulation of the probability function p, which is defined on
S3 ´ S3.  Denote a policy proposed by Left as L = (w,m,l,a) and by the Right as R =
(w¢,m¢, l¢,a¢).
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e1 and e2 are i.i.d. random variables, uniformly distributed on [0,1].  I shall assume
that j(L,R) is the fraction of the population who vote for L against R, which depends




.  The idea here is that, if
w > w¢, say, then more than one-half the worker vote for L, but there is a random element
in exactly what fraction vote for L.  The term f w'
w ( ) will be close to one if w is much
bigger than w' and close to -1 if w' is much bigger than w.  Thus, the role of the function f
is to cause the fraction of workers who vote Left to move from zero to one as w moves
from being much smaller than to much larger than w'.  The random element can be
interpreted in various ways: perhaps there is some indeterminacy in how the workers will
vote because they care about issues other than economic ones, such as religion; perhaps
there is indeterminacy because different voters transform (or interpret) the actual policies
into income distributions in different ways.
Similarly, the other terms in the expression (3.3) express the fractions of the other
three classes that vote for Left.  Ideally, one would include four random variables in this
expression, one for each class; I have settled for two, because having two already
generates a sufficiently complex probability function p, as we shall see, in which p has six
different analytical definitions, in six regions of the domain S3 x S3.  (If we used only one
random variable, there would in fact be no stochastic element in the outcome of the
elections, so two is the minimum interesting number.)
It follows from assumption (3.3) that the probability that L defeats R is11
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p(L,R) = Prob[a1e1 + a2e2 > 0] . (3.5)
There are six cases.



















Integrating, we have  
  




In like manner, we can compute the probability of Left victory in the other five cases:
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Case 4.  a1 < 0,  a2 > 0,  
-a2
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Finally we have obviously:
Case 5.   a1 > 0, a2 > 0     Þ     p = 1.
Case 6.   a1 < 0, a2 < 0     Þ     p = 0.
Thus we have defined the function p.
We now have all the information needed to define PUNE.
Our next task is to characterize the local conditions for a pair of policies'
constituting a PUNE.  These conditions derive from the separating hyperplane theorem --
more specifically, from Farkas' Lemma.
Define g(w,m,l,a) = 1 - (ww + mm + ll + aa).  The 'budget constraint' for each
party is
g(L) ³ 0,     g(R) ³ 0.
Define the gradients
ÑLp =
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Recall that a policy pair (L,R) is a PUNE if and only if the militants and
opportunists in Left (Right) do not agree to deviate to any other policy.  In particular, let
d Î Â4 be any direction such that
ÑLp(L,R) × d > 0     and     ÑvL(L)× d > 0 ;
then it must be the case that Ñg(L) × d < 0.  That is, any direction in which Left's
opportunist and militant factions would agree to deviate must lead outside the feasible
simplex of policies.  This condition can be rewritten
"dÎÂ4: ÑLp(L,R) × d > 0     and     ÑvL (L)× d > 0   Þ   -Ñg(L) × d > 0. (3.6)
But (3.6) implies, by Farkas' Lemma
5, that -Ñg(L) lies in the cone spanned by ÑLp(L,R)
and  ÑvL(L), which is equivalent to there being numbers xL, yL ³ 0 such that
-Ñg(L) = xLÑvL(L) + yLÑLp(L,R). (3.7a)
                                                
5 Farkas' Lemma states that if one vector (here -Ñg) cannot be separated by some hyperplane from a set of
other vectors (here ÑLp and ÑvL), then the former must lie in the cone spanned by the latter.14
In like manner, since the opportunists in Right want to maximize -p, if (L,R) is a PUNE,
then there are non-negative numbers xR, yR such that
-Ñg(R) = xRÑvR(R) - yLÑLp(L,R). (3.7b)
Equations (3.7a,b) are necessary and sufficient conditions for (L,R)'s being an
interior local PUNE.
6  These equations would suffice to characterize (global) PUNE if the
function p were quasi-concave – but, in fact, it is not.  We can therefore not assert that
the PUNEs we find are necessarily global.
Equations (3.7a), (3.7b) and equations
g(L) = 0 (3.8a)
g(R) = 0 (3.8b)
comprise ten equations in twelve unknowns (w,m,l,a,w¢,m¢,l¢,a¢,xL,yL,xR,yR).  Thus,
they possess either no solution satisfying the non-negativity conditions or a continuum of
such solutions.
B. The model when agricultural class struggle is resolved
We must now model the idea that in some countries, class struggle between the
landed peasantry and the agricultural worker was not an issue.  To do this simply, I
propose to say that, when class struggle in the countryside is resolved, a division of the15
agricultural product had been agreed upon; specifically, there exists a number g > 0 such
that all policies are constrained by
l = ga. (3.9)






 as the shares of the agricultural product going to
landlord and tenant, respectively.)  Thus, each party proposes a policy subject to two
constraints:  the 'budget' constraint (3.8), and (3.9).  We may reformulate this by saying
that each party proposes a policy (w,m,l) subject to
     





ø l  =  1, (3.10)
leaving 'a,' the agricultural workers' share, implicit.  Thus policies are drawn for the
simplex S2 defined by (3.10).
Assumption (3.9) is equivalent to saying that each party will propose how much
to give the rural sector, but it will leave the division of rural income to already existing
contracts between family farmers and landless laborers.
The Right's utility function is defined on S2 as
      ˆ  v  R(w,m,l) =  Log m + bR Log l ,
                                                                                                                                                
6 A local PUNE is a policy pair such that, in a sufficiently small neighborhood of each policy, the two
factions in each party cannot find another policy to which they can agree to deviate.16





preferences can be equally well represented by
      ˆ  v  L(w,m,l)  = Log w + bL Log l ,
because g is a constant.
By consulting (3.3), and using the constraint (3.9), we observe that the fraction of
voters who vote Left is:
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hence the probability of victory is given by
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The formulae defining    ˆ  p  are hence given by the six cases discussed earlier, where now we
define a1 as previously, but newly define
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Now define the budget equation as
     










Then a pair of policies L = (w,m,   l) and R = (w¢,m¢,   l¢) comprise a (local) interior PUNE
iff there exist positive numbers xL, yL, xR, yR such that17
   -Ñˆ  g  (L)  = xLÑˆ  v  L(L) + yLÑLˆ  p  (L,R) (3.11a)
and    -Ñˆ  g  (R)  = xRÑˆ  v  R(R) - yRÑRˆ  p  (L,R). (3.11b)
The analysis via Farkas' lemma again supplies these equations.
Equations (3.11a), (3.11b) and the budget constraints
   ˆ  g  (L)  =  0 (3.12a)
   ˆ  g  (R)  =  0 (3.12b)
now constitute eight equation in ten unknowns.  Either there is no solution satisfying the
non-negativity conditions, or there is a continuum of such solutions.
I call this model the three-class model.
Figure 1 illustrates Left's policy, L = (w,m,   l), in a local PUNE of the three-class
model.  The triangle DABC is the simplex S2.  The two curves illustrated in DABC are the
indifference curves of Left's militants and Left's opportunists containing L.  If L is in the
simplex's interior, then these two curves must osculate, as illustrated, in the simplex, so
that their upper contour sets are locally separated.  In fact, the PUNE illustrated is global,
from Left's viewpoint.  Of course there is a similar figure for Right's policy, R =
(w¢,m¢,l¢).
[Figure 1 here]
4. Testing Luebbert's theory18
My method for testing Luebbert's theory is simple.  I first describe the skeleton of
the method, and then fill in the flesh.  We study two countries, Germany and Sweden.  In
Germany, class struggle in the countryside was unresolved.  Therefore, we model
Germany with the four class model.  We compute the (average) probability of Left
victory in PUNEs of this model.  Then we compute, counterfactually, the average
probability of Left victory, had the three-class model described Germany.  If the three-
class-model probability of Left victory is greater than the four-class-model probability,
Luebbert's theory is supported.
Sweden was a country in which, according to Luebbert, class struggle in the
countryside was resolved.  We compute the average probability of Left victory in PUNEs
of the three-class model.  Counterfactually, we also compute the average probability of
victory in PUNEs of the four-class model, with Swedish parameters.  Again, Luebbert
predicts the first number is greater than the second.
Now for some details.
(i) Local versus global PUNEs
I have opted to use the local concept of equilibrium, for two reasons:
(a) We have an analytical representation of local PUNEs as the solution of a
system of equations.  No such representation exists for global PUNEs.19
(b) In the four class model, there are many local PUNEs, but we did not
succeed in finding any global PUNE.  We did find global PUNEs in the three-class model,
but not many.
 Thus, we shall resign ourselves to saying that parties are only capable of
evaluating small deviations of their policies from 'equilibrium.' 
7
(ii) Data
The data of the models are the sets {w,m,l,a,bL,bR,g}.  The vectors (w,m,l,a) are
computed from Przeworski et al. (1978), who assembled them from census data
8.  They
are:
For Germany in 1933:  (w,m,l,a) = (0.4242, 0.3501, 0.1584, 0.0673),
For Sweden in 1930:  (w,m,l,a) = (0.4225, 0.2385, 0.2149, 0.1244).
Thus the propertied classes constitute 51% of the adult population in Germany and 45%
in Sweden.  Germany is more urbanized than Sweden:  77% of the population live in
cities, versus 66% in Sweden.  In sum, Sweden is less urbanized but more proletarianized
than Germany.
We chose various values for the remaining data (bL,bR,g) in our calculations.
                                                
7 A superior alternative would be to construct a function p that is quasi-concave.  I have found no
reasonable formulation of the stochastic element which yields quasi-concavity in this model.
8 Przeworski et al (1978) report the detailed occupational distribution of the population of various European
countries for various years.  We partitioned the occupations into our four classes.20
 (iii) The calculations of PUNE
First, I describe the four-class model.  Our problem is to find non-negative
solutions of equations (3.7a), (3.7b), (3.8a), and (3.8b) in the twelve unknowns.  These
equations cannot be solved analytically.  We first reduce the ten equations in twelve
unknowns to four equations in six unknowns, as follows.  Solve the first two equations of
(3.7a) for (xL,yL) – this is easy, as the equations are linear in (xL,yL).  Likewise, solve the
first two equations of (3.7b) for (xR,yR).  Solve (3.8a) for one Left policy variable and
solve (3.8b) for one Right policy variable.  This leaves four equations in six unknowns.
We now generate values for two of these six unknowns randomly, and solve the
four equation system in the remaining four unknowns, via Newton's method.  We then
check the values of all twelve variables:  if they are non-negative, we have found a local
PUNE.  This and the previous paragraph describe one iteration.
Because we have two free variables to choose, it will generically be the case that, if
solutions exist, they will project onto a set of positive measure in the co-ordinate plane
associated with two of the policy components.  Thus, our method should find solutions,
if they exist.
A slight complication is introduced because there are six possible formulae for the
function p, and hence for the gradients ÑLp and ÑRp.  We therefore in fact investigated
four cases, corresponding to the four cases listed above in which 0 < p < 1.  For instance,
we carried out the above procedure letting p be defined by case 121
  







. Our procedure was to compute 500 iterations for each
case: thus, 2,000 iterations for each experiment.
The method for solving the three-class model is analogous.  First, solve two
equations of the system (3.11a) for (xL,yL), then solve two equations of (3.11b) for
(xR,yR), then solve (3.12a) for one Left policy variable and (3.12b) for a Right policy
variable.  This leaves two equations in four unknowns.  We generate two of these
unknowns randomly, and solve for the remaining two.  We check the 'case' constraint on
p, and non-negativity of the solution.  We performed 2,000 iterations for each experiment.
Tables 1 and 2 ( Tables 3 and 4) report the average probability of Left victory (p)
in the PUNEs we found for the Swedish (German) parametrs, and the standard deviation
of these probabilities (s1).  They also report the average expected vote for Left, which is
defined as
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We report as well the standard derivation of n for the PUNEs found (s2).
Figures 2a and 2b graph two projections of the set of PUNEs found, for Run 8,
Sweden,  the data being {country, year, bL , bR, g} = {Sweden, 1930, 0.5, 0.5, 1.5}.
Figure 2a graphs the projection of the simplex S2 onto the w-   l  plane of Left policies, and
figure 2b shows the projection of  S2 onto the m' -    l ' plane of Right policies.22
(iv) Observations
(1)   From Figures 2a-2b, we see that, although we are dealing with a continuum of
equilibria, they appear to be quite localized in the domain simplices.   So the average
values of the policies given in Tables 2 and 4 are quite indicative of what the typical
equilibrium looks like.
(2) In all local PUNEs, the expected vote is very close to 0.5; note how small
the standard deviations (s2) are.  In fact, in all local PUNEs we found, 0.48< n < 0.52.
Contrast this with the probability of Left victory, which varies a great deal across
experiments.  Thus it is not inconsistent to say that Left has a high probability of victory
and that we expect approximately one-half the population to vote for Left.  Paraphrased,
the expectation that the vote will be close is different from the expectation that each party
has an even chance of winning.
(3) To test Luebbert, we compare the average probability of Left victory in
the three-class and four-class models. For Sweden (see Table 1), all experiments are
consistent with Luebbert's theory except for the case (bL,bR)  = (0.1, 0.5) [see runs 8 –
12].    In that exceptional case, the Left has a higher probability of victory if there is class
struggle in the countryside.
Turning to Germany (see Table 3), we see that all experiments are consistent with
Luebbert's theory, except (bL,bR) = (0.5, 1) [see runs 5 and 6], although the case (bL,bR)
= (0.5, 0.1) [see runs 11 and 12] is inconclusive as we found only one local PUNE in the
four-class model for that parameter vector.23




 in the three-class model [see runs
1,2, and 15 of Table 1and 1,2, and 13 of Table 3].  This is because the utility functions of
the two militant factions are in this case the same, except that the Left cares about
workers primarily, and the Right cares about the middle class primarily, and w > m.  This
expectation is borne out in the observations.
(5) When there is class struggle in the countryside (four-class model, Sweden
and Germany, in the cases (bL,bR) = (0.5, 0.5) [see runs 3 and 4 of Tables 2 and 4] and
(bL,bR) = (0.5, 1) [ see runs 6 and 7 of Table 2 and run 6 of Table 4 ]), the two parties
polarize in opposite ways vis-à-vis the rural population:  the Left dramatically favors the
agricultural workers over the small farmers, and the Right dramatically favors the landed




.  These are the
clearest illustrations of Luebbert's mechanism.  The Left champions the cause of the
agricultural proletariat, while the Right favors the small farmers, which increases the
Right's probability of victory, because l > a,  over what it would be in the three-class
model.
(6) The case (bL,bR) = (0.1, 0.5) is ambiguous.  For Germany [see runs 9 and
10 of Table 2], the same intuition holds as in observation (5): in the four-class model the
Left and Right polarize in opposite ways vis-à-vis the rural classes, and the probability of
Left victory falls, in comparison to the three-class model.  But in Sweden [see runs 11 and24
12 of Table 4], although there is some polarization in what the parties offer the rural
classes, the probability of Left victory remains high --  in fact, higher than in the three-
class model.  This is inconsistent with Luebbert's theory.
(7) With the exception of the case (bL,bR) = (1, 1) in both Sweden and
Germany, both parties offer the small farmers income greater than their per capita share
(one) in the three-class model.  The irony is that, in the one case where parties do count
the welfare of the peasantry as heavily as the welfare of their primary class (b = 1), the
peasantry get less.  I have no intuition for this.
(8) The middle class is 50% larger in Germany than in Sweden.  One might
expect that this would cause the Left to offer them more in Germany than in Sweden:
there is, however, no such pattern observed.  The agricultural proletariat is twice as large
in Sweden as in Germany.  One might expect that, in the four-class model, this would
cause the Right to offer them more in Sweden than in Germany, an expectation that is
borne out by our observations.
(9)  I next summarize the observations in a different way.  Define
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for two policies (w,m,l,a) and (w¢,m¢,l¢,a¢).  aLU is the fraction of per capita national
income that Left proposes to give to the urban classes, aLW is the fraction of per capita
national income that Left proposes to give to the working classes, etc.  Table 5 presents




for every 'Run' reported in Table 2 (Sweden), and Table 6 presents the mini-tables for
every run in Table 4 (Germany).
The second columns of all the mini-tables in Tables 5 and 6 offer no surprises:  the
Left (Right) always proposes to give the working (propertied) classes more than their
share of national income.  But the first columns of the mini-tables are not so intuitive.
After all, both parties in all cases (at least weakly) favor 'their' urban class over 'their' rural
class, and so one might conjecture that all the column-one entries in the mini-tables would
be greater than one:  but this is far from the case.  The main reason seems to be that, when
class struggle has been resolved in the countryside, the parties are effectively competing
directly for the votes of landed peasantry -- cf. their utility functions -- which raises what
they offer the landed peasantry.  Consider Runs 1-4 for Sweden, in which (bL,bR) = (0.5,
0.5).  In Runs 1 and 2, corresponding to the three-class model, the rural sector receives
more than its share of national income, but in Runs 3 and 4, the four-class model, they26
receive less -- as it 'should be.'  The same pattern holds in Runs 5-7.  However, the
pattern breaks down in Runs 8-12 -- here, the rural sector does not receive more in the
three class model than in the four-class model, although it does receive more than its share
of national income in all five runs (except for the marginal Run 9, Left).  In Runs 15 and
16, where each party weights the welfare of 'its' urban and rural class equally, the
urbanites receive more than their share of national income.  Here, the aforementioned
pattern reverses:  in Run 16 (four class model), the rural sector receives a larger share of
national income than in Run 15 (three-class model).
Next consider the German story (Table 6).  How well does the conjecture, that the
rural sector does better when class struggle is resolved than when it isn't, hold?  It holds in
Runs 1-4, and in Runs 7-10.  In Runs 5-6 it also holds, but perhaps not with statistical
significance; Runs 13 and 14 appear to show no significant difference in what the
peasants are offered, and the small sample of Run 12 eliminates Runs 11-12 from
consideration.
 9
The lesson we might cautiously draw from Tables 5 and 6 is that the rural
population should receive, from both parties, a larger share of national income when class
struggle among them is resolved.  The political logic here seems clear.
A final remark is in order with regard to the 'test' of Luebbert's model we have
carried out.   What we have done is to check whether Left victory is more probable when
agricultural class struggle is quiescent, than when it is active, and we have calibrated the
model with the frequency distribution of classes from Germany and Sweden in the 1930s.27
We have simply stipulated various values for the parameters bL, bR, and g.  A desirable
alternative would be to use data on the class pattern of voting in Germany and Sweden in
the 1930s to calibrate the model  (i.e., to calculate the values bL and bR that would yield a
best fit of the model to the data).   Then, using the model so calibrated, we would
calculate the probability of Left victory under the two possible scenarios. Unfortunately,
reliable data of this kind do not exist  (there are data for class voting in Germany by city
[see Hamilton (1982)], but their accuracy is questionable).
5. Concluding remarks
Formal politico-economic analysis has, almost universally, been heretofore limited
to problems which postulate a unidimensional policy space.  Moreover, somewhat less
universally,  the equilibrium concept used has been that of a Condorcet winner in policy
space, known as a Downsian equilibrium.  The present paper departs from these
conventional practices on both counts:  it uses a concept of political equilibrium between
parties with policy preferences whose leaders are not concerned solely with winning
office, and it assumes multi-dimensional policy spaces.    Because, in the real world,
political competition is almost always carried out between partisan parties which
announce policies on a variety of issues,  the present analysis marks a theoretical advance.
I suggest that readers focus upon these two improvements over the conventional
analysis, rather than on the many remaining shortcomings of the present one.  Perhaps the
main shortcoming is that our equilibrium concept produces a continuum of equilibria in
                                                                                                                                                
9 Recall, our runs are sampling from the full set of PUNEs, so statistical analysis is, in principle, possible.28
the party-competition game.  Rather than try to refine that concept to narrow the set of
equilibria, I have been content to observe that these equilibria are quite spatially
concentrated, and so we do not lose much by looking at average values of policies over
our sampled equilibria.  Refining the equilibrium concept is not a trivial matter, for if one
posits something like Nash bargaining between the factions, with the threat point being
dissolution of the party,  one ends up inducing a complete preference order for each party
on the space TxT, and then, as with reformist Nash equilibrium, equilibria of multi-
dimensional games will generically fail to exist
10.
A second limitation of the present analysis is its reliance on simulation.  Again, I
suggest that the reader look at the other side of the coin.   We have gained in our modeling
of reality by injecting factions into political parties and many dimensions into policy
competition.  It is, perhaps, too much to ask that we do these things and in addition be
able to do comparative statics in a fully satisfactory (i.e., analytical) manner.
Thirdly, we have assumed that voters are interested only in their economic
fortunes: we have relegated non-economic interests to their influence on an unstudied
random variable that affects the fractions of classes that vote for policies.
Fourthly, we have assumed that there are only two parties, which is an historical
inaccuracy.  The Communists, in particular, were extremely important in Germany.  A
model of three party politics with proportional representation, however, is an order of
magnitude more difficult than the model in this paper, for we must propose a theory of
                                                
10 This claim is not supposed to be obvious, but it is beyond this paper's scope to pursue it.29
coalition formation to form a government, and model citizens as voting strategically, not
sincerely.
Modulo these caveats, the main result of our analysis is to provide strong but not
conclusive support for Luebbert's theory of regime choice in European countries during
the interwar period.  The support is strong because Luebbert's claim is true for most
parameter vectors of our model, and moreover, Luebbert's mechanism appears also to
hold  -- that is, the Left sustained lower probabilities of victory when class struggle in the
countryside was active because it proposed to give a lot to the agricultural proletariat and
only a little to the landed peasantry.  The support is not conclusive because there are
parameter values of our model for which Luebbert's claim is false.30
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